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|Title:||Epistemic Bootstrapping||Contributor(s):||Forrest, Peter (author)||Publication Date:||2006||Handle Link:||https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/1525||Abstract:||This paper concerns the connection between internalist justification and externalist warrant, with the aim of defending what might seem a blatantly circular way of reasoning. Because herds of thirsty pistemologists have muddied the waters I shall not, however, assume any fixed meanings for terms like "justification" and "warrant". I shall not even assume that William Alston (2005) is being unduly defeatist in giving up on the concept of justification, as in his recent work. Instead I shall examine two examples, leaving it to readers to generalise as they see fit. Some preliminary remarks are in order, however, concerning what I mean by the phrases "internalist justification" and "externalist warrant".||Publication Type:||Book Chapter||Source of Publication:||Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays, p. 53-66||Publisher:||Elsevier||Place of Publication:||Amsterdam||ISBN:||0080449794
|Field of Research (FOR):||220399 Philosophy not elsewhere classified||HERDC Category Description:||B1 Chapter in a Scholarly Book||Other Links:||http://books.google.com.au/books?id=LUWW4lrWesgC&pg=PA53
|Series Name:||Perspectives on Cognitive Science||Statistics to Oct 2018:||Visitors: 40
|Appears in Collections:||Book Chapter|
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