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|Title:||Monetary Valuation in the Law, Incommensurability and the Objection from Substitutability||Contributor(s):||Walsh, Adrian John (author)||Publication Date:||2003||Handle Link:||https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/1724||Abstract:||A long-standing tradition in philosophy has it that money-measurement is a mere expedient of computation and as such is morally neutral. Thus we have Thorstein Veblen writing in 1909: 'Money values have ... no other significance than that of purchasing power over consumable goods ... ' and more recently, James Griffin, in his 1977 article on incommensurability claiming that money is simply a medium of exchange. We find related views in the work of the economist Lionel Robbins who writes, 'Money as such is obviously merely a means - a medium of exchange, an instrument of calculation. These writers follow in the tradition of Aristotle for whom money-measurement provides us with a convenient means of comparison and in which money-measurement is understood to be morally neutral in much the same way as scientific scales of measurement are neutral. One implication of this view - although it is not one that any of the writers mentioned above draw - is that monetary evaluation per se provides no moral grounds for restricting the range of objects and activities for whichmonetary values might be calculated.||Publication Type:||Journal Article||Source of Publication:||Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, v.28, p. 103-121||Publisher:||ANU||Place of Publication:||Canberra||ISSN:||1440-4982||Field of Research (FOR):||220319 Social Philosophy||Peer Reviewed:||Yes||HERDC Category Description:||C1 Refereed Article in a Scholarly Journal||Other Links:||http://law.monash.edu.au/aslp/about-ajlp.html
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