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|Title:||Anti-realist assumptions and challenges in philosophy of mind||Contributor(s):||Khlentzos, Drew Michael (author)||Publication Date:||2007||Handle Link:||https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/2215||Abstract:||The plausibility of Naturalism - the view that the mind is a purely natural phenomenon that can be explained scientifically (if explained at all) - is a hotly contested topic in cognitive science, as every philosopher and cognitive scientist knows. It is not widely recognised, however that some of the more popular arguments against naturalism rest upon anti-realist metaphysical assumptions. This is a problem since the most plausible defences of naturalism presuppose a realist metaphysics. In this chapter, I shall chart one of these anti-realist assumptions and show how it features as a crucial premise in a leading anti-naturalist argument, the Knowledge Argument.||Publication Type:||Book Chapter||Source of Publication:||Mental States, v.1: Evolution, function, nature, p. 213-232||Publisher:||John Benjamins Publishing Company||Place of Publication:||Amsterdam; Philadelphia||ISBN:||9789027231024||Field of Research (FOR):||220312 Philosophy of Cognition||HERDC Category Description:||B1 Chapter in a Scholarly Book||Other Links:||http://books.google.com.au/books?id=YUMrT_Fnoo8C&lpg=PP1&pg=PA213
|Series Name:||Studies in Language Companion Series (SLCS)||Series Number :||92||Statistics to Oct 2018:||Visitors: 68
|Appears in Collections:||Book Chapter|
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