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Title: Moral Realism, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism and Naturalism
Contributor(s): Khlentzos, Drew Michael (author)
Publication Date: 2008
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Abstract: This paper argues that naturalistic moral realism is vulnerable to a 'Hard Problem' that has gone largely unrecognised. This problem is to explain how natural moral properties are detected by the folk. I argue that Thomas Nagel's persuasive case for moral realism founded on the priority of first-order moral evaluations over second-order reflection is not conclusive - a certain type of moral agnosticism which I call Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism can account for our inability to think of first-order moral evaluations as merely subjective or relative. Although unsatisfactory as metaphysics, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism is arguably all that a moral naturalist is entitled to by way of a meta-ethical theory.
Publication Type: Book Chapter
Source of Publication: Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice and the Will, p. 17-36
Publisher: Springer
Place of Publication: London, United Kingdom
ISBN: 9781402068713
Field of Research (FOR): 220305 Ethical Theory
HERDC Category Description: B1 Chapter in a Scholarly Book
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Series Name: Philosophical Studies Series
Series Number : 110
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Appears in Collections:Book Chapter

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