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|Title:||Moral Realism, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism and Naturalism||Contributor(s):||Khlentzos, Drew Michael (author)||Publication Date:||2008||Handle Link:||https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/2228||Abstract:||This paper argues that naturalistic moral realism is vulnerable to a 'Hard Problem' that has gone largely unrecognised. This problem is to explain how natural moral properties are detected by the folk. I argue that Thomas Nagel's persuasive case for moral realism founded on the priority of first-order moral evaluations over second-order reflection is not conclusive - a certain type of moral agnosticism which I call Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism can account for our inability to think of first-order moral evaluations as merely subjective or relative. Although unsatisfactory as metaphysics, Meta-Ethical Pyrrhonism is arguably all that a moral naturalist is entitled to by way of a meta-ethical theory.||Publication Type:||Book Chapter||Source of Publication:||Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice and the Will, p. 17-36||Publisher:||Springer||Place of Publication:||London, United Kingdom||ISBN:||9781402068713
|Field of Research (FOR):||220305 Ethical Theory||HERDC Category Description:||B1 Chapter in a Scholarly Book||Other Links:||http://books.google.com.au/books?id=RDq5C-rJ7oIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA17
|Series Name:||Philosophical Studies Series||Series Number :||110||Statistics to Oct 2018:||Visitors: 87
|Appears in Collections:||Book Chapter|
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