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Title: General Facts, Physical Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time
Contributor(s): Forrest, Peter (author)
Publication Date: 2006
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Abstract: In this chapter I assume that we accept, perhaps reluctantly, general facts, that is states of affairs corresponding to universal generalizations. I then argue that, without any addition, this ontology provides us with physical necessities, and moreover with various grades of physical necessity, including the strongest grade, which I call absolute physical necessity. In addition there are consequences for our understanding of time. For this account, which I call the Mortmain Theory, provides a defence of No Futurism against an otherwise serious objection due to David Armstrong. In addition the Mortmain theory enables me to argue against the "Parmenidean" or Block Universe position that future and past are both real.
Publication Type: Book Chapter
Source of Publication: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 2, p. 137-154
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Place of Publication: Oxford
ISBN: 0199290598
Field of Research (FOR): 220399 Philosophy not elsewhere classified
HERDC Category Description: B1 Chapter in a Scholarly Book
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Series Name: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
Series Number : 2
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